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Expert testimony is an integral part of legal decision making. It
informs judges and juries about a wide variety of topics. The
assumption underlying its admission is that the average factfinder
may lack enough knowledge about scientific or technical topics to
make fully informed decisions in the absence of such testimony.
Judges and juries are expected to be able to better understand these
topics with the expert’s assistance. However, there is concern over
exposing the factfinder to unreliable expert testimony in
circumstances where the factfinder may erroneously place a great
deal of weight on the testimony in their decision-making. Recent
developments in the law regarding expert testimony have raised
questions about how to limit the amount of unreliable expert
testimony that is presented to the factfinders in order to prevent, as
Professor Friedman puts it in his paper for this symposium, “jurors
3
from being bamboozled by unreliable evidence.” Although these
developments have theoretically altered the courts’ approach to
expert testimony, significant questions, addressed by a number of
papers in this symposium, still remain about whether the current
approach attains an appropriate level of exclusion. For example, are
admissibility standards too high or too low?
In his paper, Professor Friedman advances a number of
criticisms and suggestions about current expert testimony standards
and practices. We take these comments as a launching point for our
discussion and, as will become evident, address them from an
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empirical perspective by drawing from our on-going study of
appellate court practices and analyses. As Professor Friedman notes,
the Supreme Court clarified the standards for the admissibility of
expert testimony in the landmark decision Daubert v. Merrell Dow
4
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The Court was called upon to determine the
appropriate standard under which to evaluate scientific expert
testimony. The case concerned birth defects that were allegedly
caused by Bendectin, an anti-morning sickness drug manufactured by
5
Merrell Dow. The experts whose testimony was in question in the
case were epidemiologists, whose testimony had been excluded at the
trial court level. Prior to the Daubert decision, the prevailing standard
under which to evaluate the quality of scientific expert testimony was
6
derived from the D.C. Circuit Court opinion in Frye v. United States.
Frye concerned the admissibility of a precursor to the modern
polygraph. The court determined that expert testimony should be
admitted if it had gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
7
community, which became known as the general acceptance test.
8
Decades later, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted. The
Rules required that expert testimony assist the trier of fact, and that
the expert must be qualified in order for the testimony to be
9
admitted.
In Daubert, the Court considered the question of how the
admissibility of scientific expert testimony should be evaluated. The
Court determined that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
10
superceded Frye as the predominant standard for admission. The
Federal Rules of Evidence made no mention of Frye or of the general
acceptance test. Therefore, evaluating only general acceptance to
determine if an expert should be admitted was improper. As part of
the admission decision, the Daubert Court required trial court judges
11
to determine if the proffered testimony was reliable. This reliability
evaluation should be conducted as part of the judge’s determination
that the testimony meets the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
The Court suggested several factors by which judges could
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579(1993).
Id. at 582.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id. at 1014.
FED. R. EVID. 702
Id.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
Id. at 589.
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determine if an expert’s testimony was reliable or not. These factors
included a consideration of whether the subject of the testimony was
falsifiable or testable, whether the testimony was subjected to peer
review or publication, and whether there was a known or potential
error rate for the technique. The Court also suggested that the
general acceptance of the testimony could be evaluated. This list of
factors was not intended to be exclusive or to be applicable in every
case, but it was intended to provide some limited guidance for the
judges making these decisions.
In the years following the Daubert decision, there was confusion
among the lower courts and legal commentators concerning the
applicability of the decision to non-scientific expert testimony. The
type of expert testimony provided in the Daubert case was highly
scientific, and the suggestions made by the Court for evaluating
reliability focused on scientific methodology. Some reasoned that
the mandates of the Daubert opinion did not apply to non-scientific
evidence, and the reliability of non-scientific evidence did not have to
be evaluated to determine admissibility. Others reasoned that,
although Daubert dealt specifically with scientific evidence, the
Court’s suggestions applied equally to both scientific and nonscientific testimony. A number of commentators argued that
reliability should be evaluated for all types of expert testimony,
13
regardless of the applicability of the four suggested factors. These
issues remained open until the admissibility of an engineer, in the
14
form of a tire expert, was questioned in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.
In Kumho, the Court determined that the reliability of all expert
testimony should be evaluated to determine admissibility.
In his paper Professor Friedman challenges the idea that a high
degree of reliability should be the determining factor in admissibility
decisions concerning expert testimony, and he makes a strong case
that even unreliable evidence (that is, evidence which produces
relatively high error rates) can nonetheless be very useful to
factfinders. We are not inclined to dispute that proposition, and it is
12

Id. at 592-95.
David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert: Is It
“Scientific,” “Technical,” or “Other” Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 960 (1995);
see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271 (1994); Edson McClellan, Sharpening the Focus on Daubert’s
Distinction Between Scientific and Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1719 (1997); Karen L. Needham, Questioning the Admissibility of Nonscientific Testimony
After Daubert: The Need for Increased Judicial Gatekeeping to Ensure the Reliability of All
Expert Testimony, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541 (1998).
14
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
13
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clear from his paper that Professor Friedman does not object to
admissibility practices and standards that encourage the introduction
of reliable evidence with low error rates. However, irrespective of
one’s stance on these issues, it is clear that placing the responsibility
for evaluating the scientific reliability of expert testimony on the trial
court judges raises concerns. Foremost among these concerns is
whether or not judges have the ability to appropriately distinguish
15
between reliable and unreliable testimony.
Most judges lack
training in scientific methodology, yet Daubert calls upon them to not
only have knowledge about scientific methods, but also to apply that
knowledge in their admission decisions.
Concerns about the
interaction between judges and science are not solely a product of
the Daubert opinion. Prior to the Daubert decision, researchers
investigated judicial attitudes toward and knowledge of scientific
principles. Research by Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett suggested
that law school does not by itself prepare lawyers and future judges to
16
recognize flaws in empirical research.
That study indicated that
incoming law students had a low level of skill in statistics and
methodology (such as understanding the effects of a missing control
group) and students demonstrated no improvement in the ability to
apply statistical or methodological rules to everyday events during
17
their third year of law school.
Surveys conducted on actual judges to determine their abilities
to assess similar information suggest that judges lack the ability to
evaluate scientific reliability. For example, Manuto and O’Rourke
conducted an exploratory survey to assess federal judicial knowledge
of empirical methods, and the majority of the judges surveyed had
18
little or no knowledge of social science methods. Judges rated the
importance of several statistical measures, such as “validity.” Judges
also responded to open-ended questions about the appropriate role
of training in empirical methods in a legal education and the value of
scientific evidence in the courtroom. Results indicated that although
judges felt knowledge of social science methods “would be helpful . . .

15
Faigman and Saks, among others, observed that most judges lack training in
scientific methods, which could make their gatekeeping duty more difficult. See
Faigman, supra note 13; Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving
Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229 (2000).
16
Daniel R. Lehman et al, The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal
Discipline and Thinking about Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431 (1988).
17
See id. at 440.
18
R. Manuto & S.P. O’Rourke, Federal Judges’ Perceptions of Social Research in Judicial
Decision Making, 4 COMM. REP. 103 (1991).
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but not essential,” the majority of the judges surveyed possessed little
or no knowledge of social science methods. Overall, the judges were
disinterested or hostile toward social science. Even among those
judges having a positive attitude toward social science, the role of
20
education in social science methodology was viewed as trivial.
Although there is a large body of research investigating the
effect of expert testimony on jury decision-making, there is only a
small but influential body of empirical research that has been
conducted on judicial decision making about expert testimony. This
is likely because judicial decision making about expert testimony was
not a crucial consideration until the Supreme Court’s recent
opinions. Among this body of research is a national survey of state
trial court judges designed to assess their understanding of Daubert’s
scientific factors, their willingness and ability to apply the Daubert
21
factors. Judges’ demonstrated level of understanding of the factors
was shockingly low. While the majority of judges “clearly understand”
peer review and general acceptance, only a small percentage of
judges who thought falsifiability and error rate were useful factors
22
clearly understood the meaning of those terms.
Kovera and
McAuliff conducted another study that manipulated the quality of
the science being presented to the court, including some of the
23
Daubert factors.
While judges with some prior scientific training
were somewhat sensitive to experimental validity, judges without
scientific training were insensitive to variations in the quality of
science presented before the courts. For example, peer review was
not influential in judges’ decisions to admit or exclude the evidence,
and judges were not sensitive to experimenter bias and lack of
24
control condition manipulations.
The results of these studies suggest that irrespective of whether
reliability standards are set high or low, judges may have difficulty
assessing the reliability of scientific evidence placed in front of them.
The findings also support Professor Friedman’s arguments against
the use of a reliability standard, and a return to reliance on whether
the specialized knowledge in question “will assist the trier of fact to
19

Id. at 104.
See id.
21
See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001).
22
Id.
23
See Margaret B. Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and
Evidence Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective
Gatekeepers?, 85 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000).
24
Id.
20
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understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Of course,
on the narrow question of whether judges can understand and apply
reliability criteria, we cannot really say that the case is closed. Most
judges are probably capable of learning how to undertake the sort of
analyses advanced by the Supreme Court in Daubert, and we might
imagine that one instrument of such pedagogy is appellate court
opinions in which our most experienced and sophisticated judges
educate lower courts about appropriate methods for conducting
reliability analyses. In our analyses below, we examine pre- and postDaubert appellate opinions in an effort to ascertain the effect of
Daubert on appellate instruction in reliability analysis.
In the aftermath of these developments, the question still
remains as to whether the standards applied to expert admissibility
are too high, thereby prohibiting the admission of reliable evidence,
or too low, permitting the admission of unreliable evidence. Indeed,
in light of the studies noted above, it is even fair to ask whether trial
courts are able to differentiate more reliable evidence from less
reliable evidence. If they are not, one might ask if they instead are
relying on other standards such as the one favored by Professor
Friedman in his symposium paper—whether the specialized
knowledge in question helps “the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” In our other research on
appellate court decisions about expert evidence we have observed
that courts evaluate expert evidence in criminal trials in a manner
that is at times quite harsh and at other times without any regard for
26
demonstrations of the reliability of that evidence.
Professor
Friedman has advanced the proposition that variability in standards
for admission of expert evidence in criminal cases is defensible. His
position is that “[w]hatever the tests for admissibility may be, they
“should be very lenient for criminal defendants, and tougher for
prosecutors, with the standards for civil litigants somewhere in
27
between. ” Friedman defends this proposition by 1) noting that
prosecutors stand in a very different position than that of an accused
in such matters as discovery and party resources, 2) arguing that
because prosecutors as “repeat players” face tougher admissibility
standards for their evidence, they may be induced to produce better
evidence, and 3) recognizing the differential in stakes (reflected in

25

Friedman, supra note 3, at 1060.
See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effect of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002)
(comparing the admission rates for different types of experts in criminal cases).
27
See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1047.
26
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the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of persuasion that rests on
a shared perception that the social cost of an erroneous conviction is
many times greater than the social cost of an erroneous acquittal).
In this vein, we believe that a detailed comparison of trial and
appellate courts’ treatment of two types of testimony commonly
provided in criminal cases, police officer and psychologist testimony,
is particularly revealing. Expert testimony by police officers is
required for the prosecution of many crimes, particularly drugrelated crimes. Psychologists often testify in criminal cases, providing
information about defendants’ psychiatric diagnoses or providing
social framework evidence to aide the factfinder in appropriately
28
evaluating the evidence in the case.
In contrast to the various issues raised about other types of
experts, there has been very little criticism of police officers testifying
as experts. However, among the criticisms of the courts’ treatment of
police officers is Schumm’s—that courts admit police officers without
29
any real consideration devoted to their reliability.
Others have
argued, as a point of criticism, that when courts admit police officers
as experts, they do so using precisely the admissibility criteria
advanced by Professor Friedman in his paper for this symposium, that
is, courts refer only to assisting the trier of fact or qualifications as
30
criteria for admission. Courts do not apply Daubert to police, and
31
courts do not assess the reliability of police. The lack of broader
critical commentary about police officers as expert witnesses may be
attributed to a number of factors. Our suspicion is that a primary
factor is that police officers are viewed as inherently reliable by
courts. Survey studies of jurors indicate that police officers testifying
as experts are perceived as highly likeable, understandable,

28

Social framework evidence refers to psychological research or group data that
is unrelated to the case at hand. It is provided to give the jury an understanding of
the facts in issue. An example of social framework evidence would be an expert
discussing the body of research on eyewitness reliability, which is unrelated to any
single case, in order for the jury to properly evaluate the credibility of the eyewitness
in a specific case. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in the Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
29
See Jeffery M. Schumm, Precious Little Guidance to the “Gatekeepers” Regarding
Admissibility of Nonscientific Evidence: An Analysis of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 27
FL. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 879-80 (2000).
30
See David L. Faigman, Embracing the Darkness: Logerquist v. McVey and the
Doctrine of Ignorance of Science is an Excuse, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 97 (2001); see also
Jennifer Laser, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Applications of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1333 (1997).
31
See Schumm, supra note 29.
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believable, and confident, more so than other types of experts. It is
not much of stretch to imagine than judges share these perceptions.
On the other hand, courts and commentators have been highly
critical of psychologists testifying as experts. Psychological testimony
been described by deVyver as a dangerous type of non-scientific
33
evidence fraught with bias. Holly has characterized the testimony as
34
inherently unreliable. Faigman and others have raised questions
35
about the admissibility of syndrome testimony post-Daubert. Among
the issues raised concerning syndrome evidence is the applicability of
the Daubert factors, which are based on empirical science, to this type
of testimony, which is largely based on clinical observation and
theory.
I. ILLUMINATIONS FROM EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING IN CRIMINAL APPELLATE CASES
Based on such commentary, we can formulate several hypotheses
about how courts evaluate police officer and psychological expert
testimony and how those evaluations might have changed after
32

For example, Linz and Penrod asked jurors to rate different types of witnesses
from fifty trials, including defendants, victims, eyewitnesses, police, and experts.
Overall, police officers and experts were rated as the least dishonest and were rated
as the most likable, understandable, believable, and confident. Daniel Linz & Steven
Penrod, The Use of Experts in the Courtroom, SOCIAL PSYCHOL. (1982). Saks and Wissler
also compared jurors’ ratings of different types of witnesses, including a variety of
expert witnesses. The types of witnesses included in the survey were doctors,
chemical/drug analysts, appraisers/appraisers, handwriting analysts, psychiatrists,
psychologists, firearms experts, polygraph technicians, police, and eyewitnesses.
Participants rated their agreement with, the honesty of, and the competence of all of
the witnesses and indicated whether they had a positive experience with, a negative
experience with, or no experience with each of the witness types. Doctors, chemists,
and firearms experts were rated as the most agreeable, honest, and competent.
Accountants, eyewitnesses, psychologists, psychiatrists, and police were rated the next
highest in agreeability, honesty, and competence. Polygraph technicians and
handwriting analysts were rated the lowest on all these measures. Michael J. Saks &
R.L. Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testimony: Surveys of the Law and of
Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 435 (1984). The results of these surveys indicate that
police officers are trusted as experts, perhaps more so than psychologists.
33
See K. Issac deVyver, Opening the Door but Keeping the Lights Off: Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the Daubert Test to Nonscientific Evidence, 50 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 177, 198 (1999).
34
See J.L. Holly, Why the Daubert Standard Should Apply to Both Expert Opinions
Based Upon “Technical” or “Other Specialized Knowledge” and to Expert Opinions Based Upon
“Science” or a “Scientific Method”, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 247 (1999).
35
See, e.g., Krista L. Duncan, “Lies, damned lies, and statistics?” Psychological Syndrome
Evidence in the Courtroom After Daubert,. 71 IND. L.J. 753 (1996); Faigman, supra note
13; David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (1997); Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in
Criminal Trials: To Junk or not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1998).
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Daubert and Kumho. From one perspective, we might anticipate that
the number of police officers and psychologists who are admitted as
experts would change after Daubert or Kumho. Given that many
experts that testify in criminal cases are considered to be nonscientific, we might hypothesize that experts in criminal cases,
including police officers, will be excluded more often after Kumho as
36
the courts start evaluating the reliability of non-scientific testimony.
On the other hand, it is possible that when courts are evaluating
police officers, their primary criteria employed may be the “assisting
the trier of fact” criterion (variously promoted and criticized by
37
commentators) and the qualifications of the police officer. If true,
when judges are determining the admissibility of police officers, they
will not use the Daubert factors to determine reliability of police
38
officers and may not evaluate reliability at all.
In order to investigate courts’ evaluation of police officers and
psychologists in a systematic manner, we identified appellate court
cases concerning the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal
39
cases.
Appellate court cases were selected for several reasons
including their widespread availability, their inclusion of information
about trial court decisions, and their potential to demonstrate
40
broader trends in admissibility. The timing of the decisions ranged
36

David E. Rovella, ‘Kumho’ Could Affect Criminal Cases, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 12, 1999,
at A5.(arguing that Kumho would exert its greatest exclusionary effect in criminal
cases because much of the evidence is non-scientific, such as police officers).
37
See Faigman, supra note 29; see also Laser, supra note 29; Schumm, supra note
28.
38
See Schumm, supra note 28.
39
The search terms used to identify relevant cases in the Westlaw database were:
“admiss! /5 expert or witness.”
40
As with all empirical research, there are some limitations to the research
presented here. Appellate court decisions have the potential to indicate overall
trends in courts’ reasoning about expert testimony. Presumably, trial courts should
be attentive to appellate decision making. In light of their potential influence on
trial court decision making, several authors have highlighted the importance of
trends in appellate court decision making in the investigation of expert admissibility
including David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and
Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997); Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of
the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1047 (2003); Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks
the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 987 (2003). However, Daubert and Kumho were directed at trial court
judges and the research was conducted on appellate court cases. This results in two
important limitations. First and most important, the use of appellate court cases
results in a selection bias in the dataset. Not all cases are appealed, and the reasons
for raising an appeal or not may be wholly unrelated to the quality of the expert’s
testimony. This may be particularly true in criminal cases. For example, the
prosecution is generally barred from post-acquittal appeals of trial court decisions.
Therefore, the improper admission of a defense expert or the exclusion of a
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from five and a half years before Daubert to two years after Kumho.
Cases were coded for content on variables including the type of
testimony provided by the expert, the appellate court admission
decision, the discussion devoted to the potential evaluative criteria,
and the influence of these potential evaluative criteria on the
admission decision. Evaluative criteria included the requirements of
42
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert factors. Only cases
containing substantive discussion of the admissibility of expert
testimony were included in the database. Although we will only be
presenting the results from a selected subset of experts testifying in
criminal cases, the larger study included both civil and criminal
experts of all types. Over 1800 cases have been coded in the research
to date.
Of the experts testifying in criminal cases, 265 were police
officers. The vast majority of the police officers whose testimony was
challenged provided testimony about the behavior of drug dealers.
This testimony included information about the structure and
membership in drug organizations, the modus operandi of drug
dealers, and the habits of drug users. Often, the police officer
testifying as an expert was also the detective who investigated the
case.
There were a total of 376 psychologists providing expert
testimony in the criminal cases that were appealed during the time
period investigated. Three hundred and eight of these experts were
classified as clinical psychologists, who based their opinions and
testimony on data from clinical observation.
The clinical
psychologists in the database testified on a broad range of topics
including syndromes, child sexual abuse, insanity, competence,
disorders, and dangerousness. Sixty-eight of the psychologists were
classified as experimental psychologists, who based their testimony on
information gained from empirical research. The vast majority of the
experimental psychologists testified about issues relating to
eyewitness reliability.

prosecution expert may never appear in the dataset. Second, except for the
information about a trial court’s decision provided in appellate court opinions we
are required to make inferences about how trial court judges make their decision.
41
The cases included in the current analysis include both state and federal
appellate court cases until the time of the Kumho decision. All cases included that
were decided after Kumho are from federal courts only. Coding and analysis of the
state appellate court cases after Kumho is still underway. Therefore, conclusions
regarding the effects of Kumho should be regarded with caution.
42
For a more detailed explanation of the procedures used and the variables that
were coded, please refer to Groscup et al., supra note 26.
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Questions have been raised about whether courts are being
critical of expert testimony in criminal cases and, if so, whether courts
are being critical enough of these experts. One piece of evidence of
how critical courts are of experts in criminal cases is the rate at which
the appellate courts indicate that trial courts should have admitted
testimony that is the subject of an appeal. In our previous research
on all criminal experts, 69.1% (N = 693) of criminal experts before
43
and after Daubert were admitted. This provides a general point of
reference with which to compare the admissibility of particular types
of experts.
Police officers, who are admitted frequently, represent the high
end of the continuum of admissibility. Police officers were admitted
85.7% of the time overall. At this rate they are, as we shall see,
admitted significantly more often than both types of psychological
44
experts in criminal cases. This rate of admission was not affected by
Daubert or Kumho in that the percentage of cases in which the
appellate courts favored admissibility did not vary significantly in
comparisons of pre- versus post-Daubert and post-Kumho. There was
no change in the rates of admission for police officers after Daubert or
Kumho. Police officers continued to be admitted at a consistently
higher rate than all other experts over time. This provides some
evidence that courts are not as critical of police as experts.
Do courts demonstrate as much affection toward other experts
as they direct toward police officers, or are courts more critical of
other types of expert testimony in criminal trials? In contrast to the
courts’ positive reception of expert testimony by police officers,
courts have been less kind to their psychologist counterparts.
Psychologists were only admitted 49.7% of the time overall, as
compared to the 85.7% admissibility rate for police officers, a
statistically significant difference. However, this overall number is
not representative of how courts differentially treated clinical
psychologists and experimental psychologists.
The negative
reception of psychological testimony is particularly apparent in the
courts’ approach to experimental psychologists’ testimony. This is
the type of testimony in a criminal case that is least likely to be
admitted, with only 22.1% of these experts admitted at the appellate
level. Clinical psychologists were admitted significantly more often
than experimental psychologists. 55.8% of the clinical psychologists
were admitted. As with police officers, there was no change in rates
of admission after Daubert or after Kumho for either clinical or
43
44

See2 id.
X (2) = 115.52, V = .43, p < .001
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experimental psychologists. Experimental psychologists continued to
be admitted at a consistently lower rate than other experts over all
time periods. These rates provide some evidence that courts are
more critical of psychologists as experts, particularly experimental
psychologists.
Because the qualifications of the expert can be an influential
determinant of admissibility, an important consideration for judges
may be the basis for the expert’s knowledge. The source of the
expert’s knowledge could be another fact or which distinguishes
police officer testimony from psychological testimony. The lack of
consideration of police officer reliability could have been due to the
type of testimony and qualifications brought to the court by police.
Police officers are viewed as gaining their expertise from experience,
which is consistent with the arguments of both Faigman and
45
Risinger. In fact, their testimony was significantly more likely to be
based on experience than either type of psychologist (see Figure 1).
They were also likely to base their knowledge on case specific
experience, such as their role as the investigator in the case for which
they are providing the expert testimony, significantly more so than
for experimental psychologists. Clinical psychologists were the most
likely to have their testimony based on case specific experience, such
as their role as the therapist for the defendant or the victim in the
case. Both types of psychologists were more likely than police to base
their knowledge on their education.
However, experimental
psychologists were the most likely to derive their knowledge from a
body of research, which is consistent with an empirical approach to
psychological issues.
Courts may differentially evaluate police and psychologists on
many of the potential criteria with which they can determine
admissibility. We sought to ascertain which of those criteria and
evaluations might explain the differences in admissibility rates. We
recorded when admission criteria were specifically stated by the court
to be “met” or “not met” by the testimony. Results are presented in
Figures 2 and 3. Overall, we observe that courts are frequently
evaluating all three types of expert testimony with the Federal Rules
of Evidence requirements, but there is little use of reliability and the
Daubert factors. Several differences are observed between the
evaluations of police and psychologists. In addition to being the most
frequently admitted type of expert in criminal cases, police were
45
See Faigman, supra note 20; see also D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert
Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99
(2000).
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positively evaluated on the many potential evaluative criteria. For
example, police officers were generally found qualified to testify as
experts and their testimony itself was generally found to assist the
trier of fact. On the other hand, experimental psychologists were
negatively evaluated in general. For example, courts reasoned that
the testimony from experimental psychologists did not assist the trier
of fact. Courts’ assessments of jurors’ common knowledge provides
one explanation for courts’ reasoning that police assist the trier of
fact and experimental psychologists do not. Courts were significantly
more likely to say experimental psychology was already in the jurors’
46
common knowledge (37.8%) than police officers (8.1%). If a judge
determined that the jury already knew the content of the expert’s
testimony then that testimony would appear to be unhelpful to the
trier of fact.
Although it is informative to investigate the topics judges
discussed that were related to admissibility, determining which if any
of these factors predicts the admissibility of police officers and
psychologists is more informative. Regression models were built to
determine the predictive utility of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
of the Daubert factors. In this analysis, the outcome variable, or the
thing that we are trying to predict was the appellate admission
decision (higher values indicate the testimony was admitted).
Predictor variables are the criteria that will potentially determine
whether or not the testimony is admitted—or the value each expert is
assigned on the outcome variable, admission. The predictor variables
used in this analysis were the timing of the case (with higher values
indicating the case was decided after Daubert and Kumho), indices of
the influence of several evaluative criteria, and the interactions
among the timing of the case and the indices, which determine if
courts changed the criteria by which they determined admissibility
over time. The potential evaluative criteria included the Federal
Rules of Evidence requirements (relevance, qualifications, assisting
the trier of fact, and prejudicial impact), the Daubert factors (general
acceptance, falsifiability, peer review, and error rate), and general
reliability.
The selected criteria significantly predicted admissibility for all
three types of experts. The predictors in the model accounted for
42.6% of the variance in admission of expert testimony by police
officers, 56.4% for clinical psychologists, and 75.5% for experimental
psychologists. Timing of the case did not predict admission—police

46

2

X (4) = 44.23, V = .18, p < .001.
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officers, clinical psychologists, and experimental psychologists were
not more or less likely to be admitted after Daubert or Kumho. The
Rules’ requirements account for most of the variance in admissibility.
Assisting the trier of fact, qualifications, and relevance were the best
predictors of admissibility. Overall, the Daubert factors and general
reliability did not significantly predict admissibility. None of these
factors individually predicted admissibility for police and
experimental psychologists. However, general acceptance did predict
admissibility for clinical psychologists. There was no change over
time in courts’ use of the evaluative criteria, as evidenced by the
interactions failing to predict admission.
In summary, police officers and clinical psychologists provide
experience-based expert testimony, and experimental psychologists
rely more heavily on a body of research and their education, as
observed by commentators. Police officers are admitted as experts at
the appellate court level at a very high rate, more frequently than any
other type of expert, in contrast to experimental psychologists who
47
are often excluded. Surprisingly, the rates of admission of police
officers and psychologists were not affected by the Daubert and Kumho
decisions. Police officers and psychologists are evaluated by the
Rules’ requirements—where police assist the trier of fact and
experimental psychologists do not. Courts are not undertaking an
analysis of the reliability of police officer testimony or psychologists
when determining their admissibility.
II. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING ABOUT
POLICE AND PSYCHOLOGISTS
Several factors could explain courts’ positive evaluation of police
officers and their apparent preference for admitting them over
experimental psychologists. One motivating factor could be the
desire to assure the successful prosecution of criminals, with a
particular interest in removing drug dealers from the streets. If
courts state that police officers are unreliable in some instances, it
may become difficult to prosecute drug dealers because police
reliability will always be challenged. Recent legal developments
surrounding the reliability of fingerprinting is an example of the
problems associated with the exclusion of typically powerful and
48
heavily relied upon prosecutorial evidence.
On the other hand,
47
Risinger also argued this point and presented evidence from cases discussing
these types of experts as support. See Risinger, supra note 45.
48
See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa., 2002); see also R.
Erik Lillquist, A Comment on the Admissibility of Forensic Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
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eyewitness reliability experts typically testify for the defense to
counteract the influence of a powerful and often unreliable piece of
prosecution evidence, the eyewitness identification. This distinction
implies that there may be a preferential treatment given to experts
who testify for the prosecution as compared to those who testify for
the defense.
In fact, prosecution experts were admitted significantly more
often than defense proffered experts (see Table 1 for percentages).
Not only is there a distinction between the admission of prosecution
and defense experts overall, there is also a tendency for prosecution
experts to be admitted more frequently than defense experts within
each of the selected types of experts (see Table 1 for percentages).
Police officers and clinical psychologists were both significantly more
likely to be admitted when proffered by the prosecution. Although
the difference between the admission rates of experimental
psychologists testifying for the prosecution and the defense was not
significant, the high rate of admission for these experts when they
testified for the prosecution is worthy of note. This distinction in
rates of admission between prosecution and defense proffered
experts agrees with findings of Risinger, that criminal defendants are
49
less lucky in expert testimony appeals.
Another reason for the overwhelming admission of police
officers might be that judges, like laypersons and commentators, feel
police officers are inherently reliable and psychologists are inherently
unreliable. As for experimental psychologists, judges may truly
believe that the problems with eyewitness reliability are so well known
that it is in jurors’ common knowledge, which would explain their
persistent reasoning that this type of testimony does not assist the
trier of fact. They may also truly believe that drug dealers are outside
the ken of the average juror, requiring expert testimony in order to
educate the jury.
One common explanation for these results would be that judges
are unable to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony, including
police officers and psychologists. From the data presented, it is clear
that judges are not conducting Daubert reliability analyses of police or
psychologists to determine their admissibility. Past research on
judicial abilities to discern reliable from unreliable science indicates
that judges may not be able to undertake this task without training in

1189 (2003); Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science
(Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167 (2003).
49
See Risinger, supra note 45.
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50

scientific methodology, which may explain why reliability is not
assessed for these experts. This has important implications for the
admission of these experts and for the level at which they are
scrutinized. There is a lack of empirical research investigating the
reliability of police officers, or demonstrating the need for the
content of their testimony regarding drug dealing. If judges were
able to and did evaluate their reliability, police might not fare as well
during the admission process. This may also be true of some forms of
clinical psychological testimony that is not based on any empirical
research. Ironically, the one type of testimony evaluated herein that
has substantial empirical data regarding its reliability is experimental
psychology, which is the most frequently excluded without regard to
its reliability. Perhaps experimental psychologists would fare better
in admission if judges actually weighed reliability more heavily in
their decisions.
III. WHITHER THE STANDARDS?
So, the question remains: are the standards for the admissibility
of expert testimony too high or too low in criminal cases? Based on
our analyses of the treatment of police and psychological experts, the
answer to the question will probably depend on who is answering the
question. By taking an objective look at how courts are using their
own standards, it is difficult to determine where the bar is set at all,
let alone whether or not it is too high. It is not clear that courts are
evaluating reliability as the Supreme Court suggested, though it is
clear that Daubert analyses are not a significant feature of admissibility
analyses. If viewed in light of the positions advanced by Professor
Friedman in his symposium paper, one might actually conclude that
courts are applying a sufficiency analysis of the type advanced by
Professor Friedman. However, there is little evidence that the
analysis applies a higher standard to prosecution evidence as
advocated by Professor Friedman.
A. Experimental Psychologists
To determine if the standards are too high, too low, or just right
we might ask the experts themselves. If we were to ask experimental
psychologists and eyewitness-reliability experts in particular, they
would probably say courts are excluding this type of testimony too
often. Survey research that has probed eyewitness reliability experts’

50

See the discussion of survey and experimental research on judicial abilities to
evaluate reliability, supra at 1144-46. See also infra Part III.
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opinions about the state of the research in the area indicates there is
51
a consensus about the findings on a number of issues. The majority
of experts believe that many important factors that might affect
eyewitness reliability are not within jurors’ common knowledge, and
they agree that the purpose of experts in this area is to educate the
52
jury and not to advocate for a particular party. Further evidence of
the need for this type of testimony and that courts may be incorrect
in assuming that it is already within the common knowledge of the
jury, is provided by research on laypersons’ understanding of
eyewitness reliability. Surveys that have probed the factfinders’ level
of knowledge have shown that eyewitness reliability is outside of their
53
common knowledge.
Additionally, mock jury research
manipulating the presence of eyewitness expert testimony supports
the contention that jurors are generally insensitive to the factors that
indicate an eyewitness is unreliable, but expert testimony sensitizes
54
the jury to these issues.

51

See Saul M. Kassin & K.A. Barndollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony: A
Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1241 (1992);
see also Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research:
A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 405 (2001).
52
See Kassin et al., supra note 511.
53
Brigham and Bothwell tested the common knowledge of jurors about
identifications by asking participants to estimate correct identification rates from
lineups and to predict the results of studies on identification, such as the
confidence/accuracy relationship, the effects of stress, and the proper weight to be
afforded to eyewitness testimony. Participants performed poorly at estimating
research results and overestimated the rate of correct lineup identification. These
results demonstrated the schism between jurors’ common knowledge of eyewitness
accuracy and the expert knowledge derived from research on identification. John
Brigham & R. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1983). In another study, jurors’
knowledge of eyewitness identification was directly compared to experts’ knowledge.
See Kassin et al., supra note 511. Participants answered true, false, or don’t know to
questions previously asked of experts. Disagreement between experts and novices
was observed on fifteen of the twenty-one items in the survey, including questions
about lineup procedures, instructions, confidence, gender effects, hypnosis, time of
exposure to the target, memory, and cross-racial identification. These areas of
disagreement indicate a lack of knowledge of eyewitness identification issues by the
jurors relative to the experts. See Kassin et al., supra note 511. The authors in both
studies concluded that there is a need for expert testimony on eyewitness issues to
educate the jury.
54
See Brian L. Cutler et al., Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An Empirical
Analysis, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (1989); see also Brian L. Cutler et al., Nonadversarial
Methods for Sensitizing Jurors to Eyewitness Evidence, 20 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1197
(1990); Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 311 (1989).
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B. Police Officers
If we were to ask police officers whether they believed the
standards applied to the admission of their testimony were too high
or too low, the likely response would be that “this standard is just
right!” As one of the most frequently admitted types of experts, how
could they complain? The limited commentary that has been critical
of their unquestioned admission indicates that this preferential
treatment may be inappropriate. However, we know of no empirical
research that has addressed the reliability of police officer testimony
in this area that would support this contention.
C. Clinical Psychologists
Clinical psychologists might have a similarly positive opinion
about the treatment of their own testimony, at least relative to their
counterparts, the experimental psychologists. However, if we were to
ask legal scholars about clinical psychological testimony, the concerns
that have been expressed about this type of testimony would indicate
that these types of experts should be evaluated more critically. One
of the major focal points of the post-Daubert commentary on
psychological experts was the effect Daubert would have on the
admissibility of experts testifying about psychological syndromes.
The main criticism of syndromes used as evidence is that they have
55
not been scientifically validated or are unreliable. The evidence of
their existence has been provided mostly by clinicians’ observations
in their therapeutic practices. Little empirical research has been
conducted on these syndromes to determine if their associated
symptoms occur significantly more often in people who have suffered
a relevant trauma than in people who have experienced no trauma.
Because, in this view, syndromes generally lack scientific validity,
many commentators predicted that they would not survive a Dauberttype scientific reliability analysis and would, therefore, be
56
inadmissible after Daubert.
55

See Teresa S. Renaker, Evidentiary Legerdemain: Deciding When Daubert Should
Apply to Social Science Evidence, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (1996); see also Daniel W. Shuman
& Bruce D. Sales, The Impact of Daubert and its Progeny on the Admissibility of Behavioral
and Social Science Evidence, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (1999); Jennifer Sparks,
Admissibility of Expert Psychological Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1315
(1997).
56
See Duncan, supra note 35, see also Faigman & Wright, supra note 35 For
example, Richardson and colleagues argued that it would be difficult for
psychological syndrome evidence to meet the Daubert factors of falsifiability and error
rate, but that courts frequently rely on general acceptance when evaluating the
admissibility of this type of testimony. James Richardson et al., The Problems of
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However, the need for this testimony to educate the jury on
several sensitive issues would indicate that clinical testimony should
be admitted more often than it is. Survey research on jurors
regarding their knowledge of child sexual abuse and rape indicates
that important psychological effects of these crimes are not within
57
their common knowledge. Jurors systematically lacked knowledge
in these areas, and the experts agreed that expert testimony would be
useful to educate the jury. This would seem to be a domain in which
Professor Friedman’s emphasis on evidence sufficiency, helpfulness
and jury helpfulness would support high rates of admissibility.

Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10, 10-11 (1995).
Faigman and Wright argued that, of all the Daubert factors, Battered Woman
Syndrome would only be able to satisfy the general acceptance requirement and that
it is not helpful to the trier of fact. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 35. Morse
argued pre-Kumho that Battered Woman Syndrome is not scientific testimony and
would not be evaluated under the Daubert factors. Instead, the qualifications of the
expert, the relevance, and the assistance provided to the trier of fact by the expert
testimony should determine the admissibility of syndrome testimony. Allison Morse,
Social Science in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Battered Women, 21 HAMLINE L. REV.
287, 295-12 (1998).
57
Similar to Kassin and Barndollar, Kovera and Borgida also surveyed jurors and
compared their responses to experts. Experts in child sexual abuse were surveyed on
the demographic characteristics of victims and offenders, the typical behaviors of
victims, the typical characteristics of offenders, the cognitive capacity of child victims,
and the typical correlates of abuse. Laypersons’ responses did not correspond to
expert responses on measures relating to children’s memories, the lack of offender
information, and the typical responses to sexual abuse victimization. Expert
testimony could inform potential jurors on these issues as information the expert
possessed was outside the common knowledge of the laypersons. Margaret B. Kovera
& Eugene Borgida, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Trials: The Admissibility of
Psychological Science, 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 105, 108-12 (1997).
In addition to investigations of the common knowledge of jurors about
eyewitness reliability and child sexual abuse, research also has been conducted on
jurors’ knowledge of rape.
Frazier and Borgida gave the Sexual Assault
Questionnaire (SAQ), a questionnaire designed to measure knowledge about rape,
and seven additional items drawn from actual cases determining the admissibility of
rape trauma syndrome to expert social workers, undergraduates, and university staff.
Non-experts scored lower on the SAQ than experts, indicating that the non-experts
had less knowledge about rape than the experts. Non-experts’ lacked knowledge
about the likely victims of rape, and non-experts demonstrated more endorsement of
rape myths. However, non-experts were knowledgeable about the definition of rape,
the frequency of rape, the reluctance for victims to report rape, and rape recovery.
The authors concluded that expert testimony or jury instructions would be useful to
educate the non-experts about those measures on which they demonstrated a lack of
general knowledge. Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Juror Common Understanding
and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. (1988).
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D. Future Research Directions
The limitations and results of this research suggest several future
research directions. Because of the selection bias in our data, it
could be argued that the results are not representative of trial court
decision making as a whole. Therefore, a similar systematic,
empirical examination of trial court opinions is recommended.
These results could be compared to the results of our research to
provide a fuller picture of judicial decision-making about expert
testimony. The results of the small body of past research on judges’
abilities to evaluate scientific evidence are consistent with their
apparent lack of reliance on reliability as an admission criterion.
Because of these findings, more empirical research on judicial
abilities to evaluate reliability should be undertaken. Empirical
research investigating judges’ reasoning in the admission of police
officers and psychologists would further illuminate the distinctions
courts are making between these two types of testimony.
CONCLUSIONS
The Daubert and Kumho decisions attempted to provide the
appropriate standards for judges to determine the admissibility of
expert testimony, and yet these decisions also raised many questions
about the applications of these standards to expert testimony. In
particular, concerns arise about the appropriateness of a differential
application of these standards to different types of expert testimony.
An examination of police officers and psychologists provides
evidence that some testimony is held to very exacting standards and
other testimony is admitted with very little scrutiny. In general,
courts appear to be proceeding in a manner consistent with
Friedman’s arguments. They are definitely focusing on whether the
testimony assists the trier of fact and whether the expert is qualified.
In addition, reliability is far from the final word in the analysis of
admissibility. In fact, the research presented here indicates that
reliability is not a consideration at all in the admission decision.
Although these results are consistent with well reasoned legal
arguments, the sharp distinction between police and psychologists in
the absence of a reliability analysis is disconcerting. Even relying on
helpfulness, courts may be making decisions that are inconsistent
with the informational needs of the factfinder, the opinions of the
experts on the need for their testimony, and the extent of our
knowledge about the reliability of their respective testimonies. The
fact that the appropriateness of the standards that are being used
depends on the perspective taken indicates that the reasons for these
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distinctions need to be evaluated further. This is a clear call for
further research into judicial decision making about expert testimony
and into the courts’ approach to science.
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Figure 1: Sources of Knowledge for the Expert
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Note: Ratings of importance of each knowledge source on a scale of
0-9, with 0 = never mentioned, 1 = not at all important, and 9 = the
most important. Experience was significantly more important for
police officers than for either type of psychologist, F(2,653) = 21.08, p
< .001. Case specific experience was significantly less important for
experimental psychologists than for both police and clinical
psychologists, F(2,653) = 5.80, p < .001. Education was more
important for experimental psychologists than for clinical
psychologists and police, and it was more important for clinical
psychologists than for police, F(2,652) = 815.36, p < .001. Reliance on
a body of research was more important for experimental
psychologists than for clinical psychologists and police, and it was
more important for clinical psychologists than for police, F(2,654) =
148.49, p < .001. Theory was equally important for both types of
psychologists, but it was more important for clinical psychologists
than for police, F(2,653) = 8.90, p < .001.

2003

STANDARDS FOR EXPERTS IN CRIMINAL CASES

1163

FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF CASES STATING THE CRITERIA WERE MET BY
THE TESTIMONY
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Note. Significant differences among the types of testimony were
2
observed for assisting the trier of fact, X (2) = 23.63, V = .19, p < .001,
2
qualifications, X (2) = 27.76, V = .21, p < .001, and prejudicial impact,
2
X (2) = 16.56, V = .16, p < .001. All other differences were nonsignificant.
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FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE OF CASES STATING THE CRITERIA WERE NOT
MET BY THE TESTIMONY
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Note. Significant differences among the types of testimony were
2
observed for assisting the trier of fact, X (2) = 107.17, V = .40, p <
2
2
.001, relevance, X (2) = 32.27, V = .22, p < .001, reliability, X (2) =
2
18.0, V = .17, p < .001, general acceptance, X (2) = 14.63, V = .15, p <
2
.01, and peer review, X (2) = 7.87, V = .11, p < .05. All other
differences were non-significant.
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Table 1: Admission Rates for Prosecution and Defense Experts
Percentage of experts admitted testifying for the prosecution versus
the defense
Prosecution

Defense

91.2 %

0%

Clinical
b
Psychologists

74.6 %

26.5 %

Experimental
c
Psychologists

42.9 %

19.2 %

Police Officers

d

a

Total
88.6 %
24.4 %
a
Police officers were significantly more likely to be admitted when
2
testifying for the prosecution, X (1) = 101.72, V = .62, p < 001.
b
Clinical psychologists were significantly more likely to be admitted
2
when testifying for the prosecution, X (1) = 67.95, V = .47, p < 001.
c
Experimental psychologists were not significantly more likely to be
2
admitted when testifying for the prosecution, X (1) = 1.96, V = .17, p
> .05.
d
Experimental psychologists were not significantly more likely to be
2
admitted when testifying for the prosecution, X (1) = 358.50, V = .55,
p < .001.

